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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TROY JOSEPH ARCHULETTA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20070528-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count each of 
aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, and assault, a class 
A misdemeanor (R. 105-06)-1 This Court has jurisdiction over the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)(West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to 
reduce the charge of aggravated burglary to criminal trespass, 
where the plain language of the criminal trespass statute 
excluded defendant's conduct from its ambit? 
Review "under the Shondel rule ^focuses on the trial court's 
legal conclusions, which [the appellate court] review[s] under a 
correction-of-error standard, according no particular deference 
1
 Defendant's appeal focuses exclusively on the conviction 
for aggravated burglary. He does not dispute the correctness of 
the assault conviction. See Br. of Aplt. at 5 n.l. 
to the trial court's ruling.'" State v. Kent, 945 P.2d 145, 146 
(Utah App. 1997)(quoting State v. Voat, 824 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 
App.1991)); accord State v. Green, 2000 UT App 33, $ 5, 995 P.2d 
1250; see also State v. Pixton, 2004 UT App 275,5 4, 98 P.3d 433 
(trial court's interpretation of statutes is reviewed for correctness] 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2004), governing burglary, 
provides in relevant part: 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he 
enters or remains unlawfully in a building or 
any portion of a building with intent to 
commit: 
• • • 
(c) an assault on any person[.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (West 2004), governing aggravated 
burglary, provides in relevant part: 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary 
if in attempting, committing, or fleeing from 
a burglary the actor or another participant 
in the crime: 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person 
who is not a participant in the crime[.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206 (Supp. 2007), governing criminal 
trespass, provides in relevant part: 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass 
if, under circumstances not amounting to 
burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-
6-203 . . . 
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on 
property and: 
2 
(i) intends to cause annoyance or 
injury to any person or damage to 
any property. . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count each of aggravated 
burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-203 (West 2004), and assault, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (West 2004). Following a 
preliminary hearing, a magistrate bound him over for trial (R. 
27-28; R. 190). After a jury heard the State's evidence, 
defendant moved to dismiss the aggravated burglary charge or 
reduce it to criminal trespass (R. 191: 128-29). The court 
denied the motion, and the jury convicted defendant as charged 
(Id. at 135-36; R. 172). 
The court sentenced defendant to a suspended prison term of 
five-years-to-life on the aggravated burglary conviction and 365 
days in jail, with one day suspended, on the assault conviction 
(R. 176-78). The court imposed 36 months of probation and a 
variety of conditions, including full-time work, anger management 
intervention, random drug tests and searches, and abstinence from 
drugs and alcohol (Id.). The court held the amount of 
restitution open for sixty days (Id.). Defendant filed a timely 
notice of appeal (R. 180). The Supreme Court transferred 
jurisdiction to the court of appeals. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant had been out of touch with his mother for about a 
month (R. 191: 138). One July morning, while driving down State 
Street in Salt Lake with three friends, he spotted the vehicle 
that his mother and Dave Florez, her boyfriend of five years, 
typically drove (R. 191: 140). The car was parked at the Capitol 
Motel, in front of a room whose door was open (Id. at 19, 23, 40, 
101-02f 145). Defendant asked the driver to stop so that he 
could see his mother (Id. at 141). 
Defendant jumped out of the car and peered into the vehicle 
he thought belonged to his mother and Dave to ensure he had the 
right vehicle (Id. at 141) .2 Noticing a woman standing in the 
doorway of the motel room adjacent to the parking spot, defendant 
asked if she knew whose car it was (Id. at 26-27, 44, 142, 155, 
157). The woman asked him why he wanted to know (Id. at 27, 45, 
142) . 
Unbeknownst to defendant, his mother and Dave were no longer 
a couple, and the woman standing in the doorway was staying at 
the motel with Dave (Id. at 19). The woman testified at trial 
that when defendant approached her, he was accompanied by another 
2
 According to defendant, his mother and the victim had an 
"up an down" relationship, "were struggling," "didn't even have a 
place," and "were living in motels . . .[or] up at the 
mountains" (R. 191: 152, 154). 
4 
man. She stated that she did not invite them into the motel 
room, that defendant "pushed past me into the room," that she 
asked him to leave "a couple of times," that the other man closed 
the motel room door once they were all inside, and that she 
thought they "were getting robbed" (Id. at 27, 30, 36, 51-52, 62, 
115) .3 
Dave testified that he heard his new girlfriend outside the 
motel room talking to a male about the car and that he "kind of 
could sense the distress in her voice" (Id, at 69). He got off 
the bed and saw defendant and another man approach. When the 
girlfriend tried to block the two men from entering the room, 
Dave, who recognized defendant, moved her aside (Id. at 85-88). 
Dave testified that he sensed trouble from the start and asked 
defendant and his cohort to let the woman leave. He said that 
they refused and that defendant ordered the other man to close 
the door (Id^ at 70-71) . 
Defendant offered a different version of how the encounter 
began. He agreed that when the woman asked him why he wanted 
information about the car parked outside the motel room, he 
approached her to explain (Id. at 142). At that juncture, 
however, he spotted Dave sitting on the bed in the motel room. 
3
 A Salt Lake City police officer also testified that the 
woman reported she had asked defendant to leave the motel room 
(R. 191: 123). Whether defendant entered or remained in the room 
unlawfully has not been raised as an issue on appeal. 
5 
Defendant and Dave exchanged greetings, and defendant walked into 
the room, "figur[ing] that was my mom and Dave's motel room" (Id. 
at 145).4 He quickly looked around for his mother and, failing 
to see her, asked Dave where she was (Id.). 
The essence of what happened next is not in dispute. Dave 
told defendant that he was not with his mother anymore, and that 
he did not know where she was, but that "she's probably with some 
guy or something because I caught her like a week earlier in a 
motel room with a guy" (Id. at 72; accord id. at 53, 89, 147). 
Defendant testified that Dave called his mother a "whore" (Id. at 
147). In any event, defendant conceded that when Dave 
"disrespected" his mother, he got upset and punched Dave in the 
face with his fist (Id. at 167, 169-70). Defendant then left the 
room. 
Defendant's single blow fractured and significantly 
displaced Dave's nose. Although defendant characterized the hit 
as a Mlucky blow," Dave's nose required surgery and could not be 
restored to its former straightness even with the use of screws 
and plates (Id^ at 98, 170). 
4
 Defendant conceded he had not been invited into the room 
but thought that Dave and his mother were still together. At 
trial, he rhetorically asked, "[I]f you're part of somebody's 
family, do you — do you just ask them to walk in when you're 
going into their house?" (R. 191: 163). 
6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues on appeal that he should not have been 
convicted of aggravated burglary because the lesser included 
offense of burglary has the same elements as criminal trespass. 
Consequently, he asserts, he could only be charged and convicted 
of the crime carrying the lesser penalty — criminal trespass. 
Defendant's argument invokes the Shondel doctrine, which 
holds that if two statutes are "wholly duplicative" and thus 
define the same offense, a defendant is entitled to be sentenced 
under the statute carrying the lesser penalty. State v. Bryan, 
709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985) (citing State v. Shondel, 435 P.2d 
146 (Utah 1969)). Defendant's Shondel argument fails for two 
reasons. First, defendant asks this Court to reverse or to 
reduce his felony conviction to a misdemeanor by comparing 
burglary with criminal trespass. Defendant, however, was charged 
with and convicted of aggravated burglary, not burglary. Thus, 
for Shondel purposes, the elements of criminal trespass must be 
compared with the elements of aggravated burglary, not simple 
burglary. Aggravated burglary requires that the actor "causes 
bodily injury," while criminal trespass requires only an intent 
to cause annoyance or injury. Because the two statutes are not 
"wholly duplicative," Shondel does not apply to his case. Bryan, 
709 P.2d at 263. 
7 
Second, even assuming arguendo that a comparison between 
simple burglary and criminal trespass were appropriate, the plain 
language of the criminal trespass and burglary statutes reveals 
that the two crimes are not identical. The plain language of the 
criminal trespass statute explicitly states that a person is 
guilty of criminal trespass only if the circumstances 
constituting the crime do not amount "to burglary as defined in 
Section 76-6-202 [burglary], 76-6-203 [aggravated burglary] or 
76-6-204 [burglary of a vehicle]. . .." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
206. Because the two crimes are not "wholly duplicative," Shondel 
does not apply. 
Here, where it is undisputed that defendant entered or 
remained unlawfully in the motel room and intended to assault the 
victim, his conduct fell squarely within the burglary statute. 
Pursuant to the plain language of the criminal trespass statute, 
the inquiry ends because there is no overlap between the two 
statutes. That is, culpability for burglary forecloses the 
possibility that defendant committed the lesser offense of 
criminal trespass. Where defendant was culpable for burglary and 
where there is no dispute that the victim sustained bodily 
injury, the trial court properly refused to reduce the charge 
from aggravated burglary to criminal trespass. 
8 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO REDUCE THE 
CHARGE OF AGGRAVATED BURGLARY TO 
CRIMINAL TRESPASS WHERE THE PLAIN 
LANGUAGE OF THE CRIMINAL TRESPASS 
STATUTE EXCLUDES DEFENDANT'S 
CONDUCT FROM ITS AMBIT 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his 
motion to reduce the felony charge of aggravated burglary to a 
misdemeanor charge of criminal trespass (Br. of Aplt. at 10). He 
reaches this conclusion by asserting that he could not be 
convicted of aggravated burglary because he could not be 
convicted of burglary (Id. at 5). He contends that, "pursuant to 
equal protection guarantees," he could not be convicted of 
burglary because the elements of burglary and criminal trespass 
are identical (Id.). And, where two crimes have the same 
elements, he concludes that he could be charged and convicted 
only of the crime carrying the lesser penalty—criminal trespass 
(Id. at 9-10). 
Defendant's argument is based on State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 
146 (Utah 1969).5 Under Shondel, when two statutes define two 
crimes having exactly the same elements but carrying different 
penalties, a defendant is entitled to the lesser penalty. That 
5
 While defendant nowhere cites to Shondel in his appellate 
brief, he does briefly cite to State v. Bryan, one of Shondel's 
progeny. See Br. of Aplt. at 5. Also, at trial, defense counsel 
explicitly referenced Shondel to support this argument. See R. 
191: 131-33. 
9 
is, "where there is doubt or uncertainty as to which of two 
punishments is applicable to an offense[,] an accused is entitled 
to the benefit of the lesser." 453 P.2d at 148 (citations 
omitted). The doctrine is limited in scope because it "applies 
only when the two statutory provisions proscribe precisely the 
same conduct." State v. Jensen, 2004 UT App 467, 116, 105 P.3d 
951 (citing State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, 533, 52 P.3d 1210). Two 
statutes are the same when they are "wholly duplicative as to the 
elements of the crime." State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263. 
This case does not fall within the ambit of Shondel for two 
reasons. First, defendant's argument turns on a comparison of 
the burglary and criminal trespass statutes. Defendant, however, 
was not charged with burglary. He was charged with aggravated 
burglary. For purposes of Shondel, then, the elements of 
criminal trespass must be compared to the elements of aggravated 
burglary, not simple burglary. The results of this comparison 
are clear. Aggravated burglary requires that the actor "causes 
bodily injury," while criminal trespass requires only the intent 
to cause annoyance or injury. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
203(1) (a) with Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206 (2) (a) (i) . The two 
statutes are, therefore, not "wholly duplicative," and Shondel 
does not apply. Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263. 
Second, even assuming arguendo that a comparison between 
simple burglary and criminal trespass were appropriate, the plain 
10 
language of the criminal trespass statute makes clear that the 
two statutes do not overlap, much less that they proscribe the 
same conduct and are "wholly duplicative."' "Where statutory 
language is plain and unambiguous, appellate courts cannot look 
beyond the language to divine legislative intent, but must 
construe the statute according to its plain language." State v. 
Paul, 860 P.2d 992, 993 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Brinkerhoff v. 
Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989)); see also Norman J. 
Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.01 (5th ed. 
1992)(if statutory meaning is clear, court's sole function is to 
enforce statute according to its terms). 
Here, the plain language of the criminal trespass statute 
leaves no doubt as to which of two punishments is applicable to 
defendant's conduct because the two statutes do not proscribe the 
same conduct. The statute's plain language forecloses any 
Shondel claim because it specifically excludes any overlap 
between burglary and criminal trespass. The criminal trespass 
statute provides: 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass 
if, under circumstances not amounting to 
burglary as defined in Section 16-6-202, 16-
6-203 . . . 
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on 
property and: 
(i) intends to cause annoyance or 
injury to any person or damage to 
any property. . . 
11 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(2) (emphasis added). When interpreting 
a statute, " [w]e presume that words are used in their ordinary 
sense." State v. Paul, 860 P.2d at 993 (citations omitted). As 
long as the ordinary meaning of a word results in a statutory 
application that is reasonably clear and operable and does not 
contradict the express purpose of the statute, then that ordinary 
meaning controls. Morton IntTl, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 
581, 590 (Utah 1991); accord Archer v. Board of Lands & Forestry, 
907 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Utah 1995); Commercial Inv. Corp. v. 
Siqqard, 936 P.2d 1105, 1111 (Utah App. 1997); B.L. Key, Inc. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 934 P.2d 1164, 1166 (Utah App. 1997). 
Here, the plain language of the criminal trespass statute, 
xxunder circumstances not amounting to burglary," provides that a 
person is guilty of criminal trespass only if the circumstances 
of the crime do not amount to burglary, as defined by the 
burglary and aggravated burglary statutes. Pursuant to the 
ordinary meaning of this phrase, no overlap exists between acts 
constituting criminal trespass and those constituting burglary. 
If defendant has fulfilled the requirements for burglary, he has 
committed that crime and not criminal trespass. By definition, 
then, criminal trespass is something less than burglary.6 
6
 Indeed, the court instructed the jury on criminal 
trespass as well as on the elements of burglary and aggravated 
burglary (R. 163-66). Had the jury believed that defendant 
committed a crime that did not amount to burglary, it could have 
convicted him of criminal trespass. The jury, however, rejected 
12 
On appeal, defendant does not dispute that the evidence 
established the elements of burglary. He does not dispute either 
that he entered or remained in the motel room unlawfully or that 
he assaulted the victim. He limits his appellate argument to the 
assertion that criminal trespass forbids precisely the same 
conduct as burglary. But he reaches that conclusion only by 
ignoring a key phrase in the criminal trespass statute, "under 
circumstances not amounting to burglary as defined in Section 76-
6-202, 76-6-203." His argument fails. 
The law is well-settled that "when two statutes under 
consideration do not proscribe the same conduct, . . . defendant 
may be charged with the crime carrying the more severe sentence." 
State v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841, 844 (Utah 1981) (citations 
omitted); accord State v. Kent, 945 P.2d at 147-49. Here, when 
defendant entered the motel room and formed the intent to assault 
the victim, he fulfilled all the elements of burglary. 
Consequently, he could not be guilty of the lesser-included 
offense of criminal trespass, which comes into play only "under 
circumstances not amounting to burglary." Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-6-
203(2). And, when defendant punched the victim so forcefully in 
the nose as to fracture and displace it, he caused bodily injury 
that elevated his crime to aggravated burglary. Under these 
that alternative (R. 172). 
13 
circumstances, the trial court properly denied his motion to 
reduce the charge of aggravated burglary to criminal trespass. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction on one count each of aggravated burglary, a first 
degree felony, and assault, a class A misdemeanor. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 29th day of November, 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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